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ABSTRACT 
There is no consensus on the relationship between working memory 
resources and mind wandering. The purpose of the current study is to investigate 
whether mind wandering requires working memory resources to be sustained. 
The resource-demanding view is that mind wandering requires working memory 
resources to sustain an internal train of thought (Smallwood, 2010). The 
resource-free view is that mind wandering is a result of executive control failures 
and this internal train of thought proceeds in a resource-free manner (McVay & 
Kane, 2010). Participants were presented with thought probes while they 
performed a Simon task in single and dual task conditions. From the resource-
demanding view, individuals with high WMC should experience more Task 
unrelated thought (TUT) in single and dual task conditions compared to those 
with low WMC. From the resource-free view, individuals with high WMC should 
experience fewer TUT compared to low WMC individuals. Results indicated that, 
WML eliminated the Simon effect for high WMC and reduced it for low WMC 
group. Mind wandering was decreased in dual task conditions however there was 
no effect of working memory capacity on mind wandering. Also, mind wandering 
correlated with task performance measures for the low WMC but not high WMC 
group. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for either a 
resource-demanding or resource-free view and are discussed in terms of a 
context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank Hideya Koshino for being a great mentor and Thesis 
advisor. I greatly appreciate his dedication to my learning and development as a 
research scientist in Cognitive Psychology. Hideya’s guidance has helped me 
succeed at a graduate level of education; I owe my success in this program to 
him. I would also like to thank Bob Ricco and John Clapper for serving on my 
Thesis committee and offering helpful suggestions in my Thesis work. I would not 
have been able to conduct this experiment without the dedicated work of 
research assistants involved with the Working Memory Screening Sessions 
conducted Fall 2013 and Winter 2014 quarters, so I would like to acknowledge 
their contribution.   
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT  ................................................................................................. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ............................................................................ iv 
LIST OF TABLES  ........................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES  ...................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Defining Mind Wandering  .................................................................. 1 
Measuring Mind Wandering  .............................................................. 3 
Models of Mind Wandering ................................................................ 6 
The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering  ......... 12 
The Simon Task  ................................................................................ 22 
CHAPTER TWO: THE CURRENT STUDY 
 Hypotheses  ....................................................................................... 26 
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
  
 Participants  ....................................................................................... 30 
 Stimuli  ............................................................................................... 31 
 Procedure .......................................................................................... 33 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS  
Demographics  ................................................................................... 36 
Simon Task ........................................................................................ 36 
Memory Task  .................................................................................... 41 
Thought Probes  ................................................................................ 42 
 vi
Correlations   ..................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION  
 Summary of Results .......................................................................... 53 
 The Role of Working Memory in the Simon Task  .............................. 53 
 The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering  ......... 55 
 Conclusion  ........................................................................................ 61 
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER  .................................................... 63 
APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORM  ............................................ 65 
REFERENCES  ............................................................................................ 67 
  
 vii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the 
               Simon Task with Working Memory Load Conditions for 
               Low and High Working Memory Capacity Participants  ................. 37 
Table 2. Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the  
               Memory Task for Low and High Working  
               Memory Capacity Participants ....................................................... 42 
 
Table 3. Mean Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought Response Options  
               Comparing WMC in Single and Dual Tasks  .................................. 44 
Table 4. Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and  
     Performance Measures for High Working  
     Memory Capacity Participants  ...................................................... 51 
 
Table 5. Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and  
     Performance Measures for Low Working  




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Trial Sequence For Dual Task and Single Task Conditions  ......... 35 
 
Figure 2. Mean Reaction Times on Compatible and Incompatible Trials  
                for Working Memory Capacity Groups, 
                Collapsed Across Task Conditions  .............................................. 39 
 
Figure 3. Mean Reaction Times on Compatible and Incompatible Trials  
                for Working Memory Load Conditions, Collapsed  
                Across Working Memory Capacity Groups  .................................. 40 
Figure 4. Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought for Low and  
      High Working Memory Capacity Participants in  
      Single and Dual Task Conditions  ................................................. 45 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Future-oriented Thought Out of Total Number of 
                Thought Reports for Low and High Working Memory Capacity 
                Participants in Single and Dual Task Conditions  ......................... 47 
Figure 6. Percentage of Past-oriented Thought Out of Overall  
      Task-Unrelated Thoughts for Low and High  
      Working Memory Capacity Participants in  





The experience of having one’s mind drift from a task into daydreaming, 
rumination, or planning is a common experience most are familiar with, and can 
be referred to as mind wandering. It is interesting that this phenomenon of mind 
wandering has only recently made it into mainstream psychology research, given 
its ubiquitous nature. 96% of adult Americans report daydreaming of some kind 
every day (Singer & McCraven, 1961). Additionally, as many as 30% of thoughts 
that people experience in a day can be classified as mind wandering (Kane et al., 
2007). The prevalence of mind wandering may be an under-recognized influence 
on human behavior and performance in a variety of areas, such as education 
(Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007). Furthermore, research investigating 
the nature of mind wandering is and may continue to reveal important cognitive 
functions of the human mind. There are two things that must be considered 
before discussing the empirical research on mind wandering; 1) the terms used 
to characterize mind wandering and 2) the various methods developed to 
measure mind wandering. 
 
Defining Mind Wandering  
While research in psychology has viewed human thought as a goal-
directed phenomenon, recent interest in mind wandering and the default mode 
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network (e.g., Christoff, 2012) has begun to consider the undirected and 
spontaneous nature of thought. Since this research is in its early stages, there is 
still uncertainty as to the terminology that should be used to classify various 
forms of undirected spontaneous thought. Christoff (2012) defines undirected 
thought as “not deliberately directed” by the thinker yet it may be implicitly biased 
by the individuals current concerns or emotional state. The important distinction 
between undirected and directed thought is that undirected thought does not 
proceed by conscious effort towards a particular outcome, characteristic of goal-
directed thought. Spontaneous thought is defined as unintended thoughts that 
come to mind unbidden and effortlessly (Christoff, 2012). This can occur in 
several forms such as daydreaming or mind wandering, although the distinction 
between different forms of spontaneous thought is not yet clear. Nevertheless, 
the most recent research prefers the term mind wandering, operationally defined 
as task-unrelated thought (TUT) (Christoff, 2012). While the term stimulus-
independent thought (SIT) is often used in place of mind wandering, especially in 
the cognitive neuroscience literature, a distinction between SIT and mind 
wandering should be made (Christoff, 2012). TUT is simply defined as any 
thought that is not related to a current task, and is contrasted with task-related 
thought. SIT is defined as thought that is decoupled from current sensory 
information. SIT is contrasted with stimulus-oriented thought, which is thought 
directed towards the external sensory environment. TUT can be directed 
internally, as SIT, to the current concerns of the individual; or externally, as 
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stimulus-oriented thought, toward stimuli in the environment not related to the 
task (e.g. footsteps from the floor above). While SIT may be unrelated to a 
current task, it can also be related to the task but not current perceptual stimuli, 
such as during memory recall tasks. Therefore, TUT and SIT should be 
considered as two independent dimensions of mind wandering. Whatever the 
content of TUT, be it stimulus-independent or stimulus-oriented, the experience 
of having ones mind drift away from a current task and towards unrelated 
concerns is typically referred to as mind wandering (Christoff, 2012). 
 
Measuring Mind Wandering 
Methods for directly measuring in-the-moment mind wandering can be 
classified into two categories, probe-caught and self-caught methods (Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2006). In the probe-caught method, individuals are interrupted 
(probed) during a task and are asked what they were thinking about, at the 
moment the probe occurred. How the individual is asked to respond can vary 
depending on what the researchers are investigating. In the experimenter-
classified probe method, participants are asked to report the content of their 
thoughts, either verbally or written, and the experimenters can later code these 
reports into task-unrelated and task-related thought (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & 
Reid, 2003). An alternative to this is the self-classification probe method, in which 
participants classify their own subjective experience into a set of given response 
options (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). There are typically at least two response 
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options such as task-related or task-unrelated thought, but again this can vary 
depending on the nature of the experiment. In the self-caught method, individuals 
are asked to monitor their awareness for mind wandering thoughts, and report 
when they experience TUT. Since this method is confounded with awareness of 
mind wandering, the probe-caught method is a better measure of the overall 
frequency of mind wandering. Nevertheless, as Smallwood and Schooler (2006) 
point out, the use of both self-caught and probe-caught methods may be useful 
for distinguishing between mind wandering with and without awareness. Another 
method that is used to directly measure mind wandering is the use of 
retrospective reports where participants, after completing a task, fill out a 
questionnaire to measure their subjective experience during the task 
(Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006).  
Numerous studies have found reliability among these different self-report 
measures of mind wandering (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Smallwood, 
Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, Haskell, 
& Ballantyne, 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Behavioral and physiological 
indices of mind wandering on the sustained attention to response task (SART) 
have also been investigated (fMRI activity: Christoff, 2012; Mason et al., 2007, 
EEG activity: Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008, Response times: 
Smallwood, McSpadden, Luus, & Schooler, 2008; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 
2004, pupil diameter: Smallwood et al., 2011; Galvanic skin response and heart 
rate: Smallwood et al., 2003).  
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The (SART) is a common task used to investigate the nature of mind 
wandering (Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004). During this task, participants are to 
make a response to frequent non-target stimuli (go trials) and withhold their 
response to infrequent target stimuli (no-go trials). This creates a prepotency to 
make a response on all trials since no-go trials are infrequent (e.g. 11% of trials). 
Failure to withhold a pre-potent response on no-go trials is referred to as action 
slips and thought to result from attentional lapses (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). An attentional lapse implies that attention has shifted 
away from task-relevant information to task-irrelevant information, leading to 
more automatic pre-potent responding. Similar experiences can be found in daily 
life such as automatically driving on the typical route home from work instead of 
stopping at the supermarket to pick up dinner. The similarity this laboratory task 
shares with everyday occurrences of attentional lapse is one reason the SART 
has been used in research on mind wandering. The interruption of mind 
wandering thoughts can be seen as an example of an attentional lapse where 
one’s attention has shifted away from a current task and towards internal trains of 
thought. Additionally, certain response behaviors on the SART have been 
associated with the occurrence of mind wandering that is also characteristic of 





Models of Mind Wandering 
Studies have revealed that mind wandering may have an unrecognized 
influence on our behavior. For instance, mind wandering while reading impairs 
comprehension of the text, which may have important implications in education 
(Smallwood, Fishman, et al., 2007). Unsworth and McMillan (2012) found that 
motivation and topic interest influence mind wandering while reading, and these 
factors influence scores on reading comprehension tests. The occurrence of 
mind wandering even impacts an individual’s score on measures of WMC and 
general fluid intelligence (Mrazek et al., 2012). Also, the negative impact 
stereotype threat has on cognitive performance may partly be mediated by an 
increase in mind wandering (Mrazek et al., 2011). Since researchers have been 
interested in the detrimental effects mind wandering may have on task 
performance, models of mind wandering attempt to explain what causes it to 
occur and why it leads to poor task performance (Smallwood, 2013). Four main 
models of mind wandering that explain either what causes it to occur or the 
processes involved in its maintenance are discussed as follows (Smallwood, 
2013). 
Perceptual Decoupling Model 
The perceptual decoupling model seeks to address the processes 
involved in maintenance of mind wandering, and not necessarily what factors 
lead to its occurrence. This model explains performance decline as reflecting 
domain-general resource competition between external task events and internal 
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trains of thought (Smallwood, 2013). As mind wandering ensues, attention is 
decoupled from external events and directed towards internal thoughts and 
feelings. Initial evidence for this came from studies showing reduced mind 
wandering as task demands increased. For instance, faster stimulus presentation 
rates and increased memory load, decrease frequency of stimulus-independent 
thought (SIT) (Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993).  Therefore as task 
demands increase, resources are deployed to processing external events rather 
than internal trains of thought.  
As a result of this decoupling, processing of external events is going to be 
degraded during mind wandering compared to when attention is focused on the 
task (Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007). A number of studies 
have shown decreased task performance during mind wandering episodes. For 
instance, it has been shown that during periods of SIT, participants perform 
worse by making more stereotypic responses on a random number generation 
task (Teasdale et al., 1995). Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler (2008) found 
that zoning out (mind wandering without awareness) while reading reduced text 
comprehension. More direct evidence for decreased processing of external 
events during mind wandering comes from studies looking at pupil diameter (PD) 
and EEG cortical activity. Smallwood et al. (2011) examined PD activity during 
periods indicative of online (external task processing) and offline  (internally 
generated thought processing) thought. In a choice reaction time task, during 
online thought PD activity changed in response to processing external task 
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stimuli whereas during offline thought PD activity was decoupled from task 
events. In addition Smallwood, Beach, et al. (2008), using the SART, found a 
reduction in the amplitude of the P300 (an index of attention directed toward 
stimulus processing) for non-targets during TUT compared to during on-task 
thoughts. The assumption of the perceptual decoupling model is that domain-
general resources are shared between both external and self-generated trains of 
thought. For example, in the same way as working memory resources are 
involved in the control of external task information, working memory resources 
are also required for the continuity of self-generated thought (Smallwood, 2013). 
From this perspective, working memory resources do not directly control the 
occurrence of mind wandering, but once attention shifts to internally generated 
thought, executive processes act to ensure its continuity by preventing 
interruption from external stimulation. 
Current Concerns 
 The perceptual decoupling model explains the processes involved in mind 
wandering but there is still the question of “what factors lead to the occurrence of 
mind wandering in the first place?” Recall that mind wandering was defined as 
undirected thought that is “not deliberately directed” by the thinker yet may be 
directed by the thinkers current concerns. According to Klinger's (2009) current 
concerns theory, daydreaming and mind wandering occur when there is a 
discrepancy between a current state and unresolved goal. Watkins' (2008) 
control theory approach states that all behavior, including repetitive thought, is a 
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process of feedback control where one’s current state is compared with a 
reference value such as an unresolved goal. If there is a discrepancy between 
the current state and an unresolved goal, then the behavior will be adjusted to 
bring it closer to the goal state. Internally generated thought focused on resolving 
a discrepancy will persist, and may result in mind wandering, until either the goal 
is attained or it is abandoned. Klinger (2009) indicates that the persistence of 
current concerns is continuous and automatic, “Thus, having a goal entails a 
covert mental process that persists over the life of the goal pursuit.” (Klinger, 
2009, p. 229). Additionally one’s current concerns may be automatically triggered 
by salient cues either in the environment or by other internal processes such as 
memories and will form the content of mind wandering thoughts. 
Meta-awareness 
Another characteristic of mind wandering is that the experience is often 
accompanied with a lack of awareness of its occurring, in which one may 
suddenly catch oneself in such a state without having realized it. Schooler et al. 
(2004) used both self-caught (awareness of mind wandering) and probe-caught 
(not aware of mind wandering) methods to measure mind wandering during text 
reading, and found that mind wandering often occurred without awareness. Using 
thought probe methods in addition to assessing awareness of one’s immediately 
prior experience, Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler (2009) 
found that performance on the SART was impaired more during mind wandering 
without awareness compared to with awareness. Schooler (2002) explains this 
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meta-awareness (meta-consciousness) model of mind wandering from a 
framework of the relationship between meta-awareness and basic conscious 
experience. While conscious processes continuously occur and are monitored 
largely by non-conscious processes, meta-awareness is only intermittent. Meta-
awareness is a re-representation of the contents of conscious experience, in 
which one can report or interpret one’s state of mind. For example, while reading 
a text, attention may become decoupled and directed towards an internal train of 
thought. This decoupled attention may not be corrected until meta-awareness 
detects the discrepancy between the intended goal (reading a text) and the 
content of experience (mind wandering) (Schooler et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
absence of meta-awareness may explain the occurrence of some mind 
wandering episodes in addition to moderating the detrimental effects of mind 
wandering on performance.  
Control Failure 
 McVay and Kane (2010) proposed a Control Failure x Concerns model of 
mind wandering. According to this model, one’s current concerns may 
automatically activate task-unrelated thoughts and then, failure to maintain 
attention on a current task is what will lead to mind wandering. From this 
perspective, greater control of executive attention allows one to maintain task 
goals and avoid attention drifting away from the task towards task-unrelated 
thoughts. For instance, under conditions of reduced executive control, such as 
fatigue and alcohol inebriation, rates of TUT increased (McVay & Kane, 2009; 
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Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004). The 
control-failure model claims that, while mind wandering occurs because of 
executive control failures, it does not require working memory resources to be 
sustained. Evidence for this comes from McVay and Kane (2009), in which they 
found that TUT decreased as executive attention abilities (working memory 
capacity) increased. 
Default Mode Network 
 Interest in the phenomena of mind wandering also comes from the 
cognitive neuroscience literature trying to understand the role of a network of 
brain regions, now referred to as the default-mode network (DMN). The DMN 
includes areas in the medial parietal cortex (posterior cingulate and precuneus), 
posterior lateral cortex (Parietal lobe: BA 40 and 39; temporal lobe: BA 22), 
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6, 8, 9 and 10) (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). This 
network of brain regions was shown to be functionally active at rest (a passive 
state when not engaged with a task) and decreased activation during task 
engagement (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Because of this pattern of activation the 
DMN has been implicated in activities such as mind wandering that are likely to 
occur during periods of non-task engagement. In fact, activity in the DMN has 
been shown to be associated with stimulus-independent thought and the 
occurrence of mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 
2009; Christoff, 2012; Mason et al., 2007). Consistent with this evidence current 
concerns theory posits daydreaming and mind wandering as a mental default 
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state arising from activity in the DMN (Klinger, 2009). Furthermore, as executive 
network regions (such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsal lateral 
prefrontal cortex) show increased activation, the DMN shows decreased 
activation during task engagement. Even in the absence of an ongoing task 
these two network regions have been shown to be anti-correlated (Fox et al., 
2005). Koshino et al. (2011) found medial prefrontal cortex (DMN region) 
activation during task preparation and deactivation during task execution, within a 
single trial. These results suggest that activation and deactivation of default 
mode and executive network regions are influenced by the allocation of 
attentional resources due to task demands. 
 
The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering 
 Smallwood (2013) integrates the perceptual decoupling, current concerns, 
meta-awareness and control failure models into a Process-Occurrence 
framework of mind wandering and discusses how these models explain different, 
though not competing, mechanisms for the occurrence and processes underlying 
mind wandering. The current concerns, meta-awareness, and control failure 
models explain what may lead to the occurrence of a mind-wandering episode, 
while the perceptual decoupling model explains the processes involved once 
mind wandering has ensued. Nonetheless, the decoupling and control failure 
models explain a different relationship between working memory resources and 
mind wandering. The decoupling model claims that working memory resources 
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support the continuity of internal trains of thought; this hypothesis will be referred 
to as the resource-demanding view. On the other hand, the control failure model 
claims that internal trains of thought are automatically cued by current concerns, 
sustained in a resource-free manner and that mind wandering is a result of 
executive control failure; this will be referred to as the resource-free view. 
 In order to understand these two competing perspectives on mind 
wandering, the concept of working memory resources and its relation to mind 
wandering needs to be discussed. While several models of working memory 
have been proposed, it is widely considered to represent a mental workspace 
and consist of at least two resource limited systems; temporary memory stores 
(i.e. phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad: ) and the central executive 
(Baddeley, 2000). The central executive system is responsible for coordinating 
what information can gain access to limited-capacity memory stores as well as 
the maintenance and manipulation of items in working memory. In this way, the 
central executive system controls the allocation of attentional focus, such as 
when switching attention from one task to another, maintaining information in 
memory while performing an independent task or inhibition of processing 
distracting information and selection of task relevant information. 
Working Memory 
The concept of working memory capacity (WMC) is not well defined. One 
view refers to WMC more generally as the amount of working memory resources 
available for both temporary memory storage and executive processes 
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(Baddeley, 2010; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). As more working 
memory resources are allocated towards maintenance of information held in 
working memory, fewer resources are available for executive processes. This 
resource view of working memory capacity has been investigated on a wide 
variety of distractor interference tasks. By loading working memory with items to 
be maintained in memory while performing a concurrent task, the ability for 
executive processes to reduce distractor interference is diminished (for a review; 
de Fockert, 2013). Also consistent with this view is that individuals with higher 
WMC have a greater amount of working memory resources at their disposal 
compared to those with lower WMC (Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). Generally, tasks 
that measure individual differences in working memory capacity are dual tasks 
requiring the participant to hold information in memory while performing an 
attention demanding task, such as complex-span tasks (Redick et al., 2012). 
Individuals with more working memory resources should therefore score higher 
on complex-span tasks than individuals with fewer working memory resources.  
An alternative view of WMC is that it mainly reflects control of executive 
attention. Individual differences in WMC are thought to mainly reflect differences 
in the ability to control attention, especially in contexts of competing demands, 
such as dual task situations. For instance, individuals with high WMC, compared 
to those with low WMC, are better able to inhibit irrelevant distractor information 
(Heitz & Engle, 2007; Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012), maintain task goals 
(Kane & Engle, 2003), and allocate visual attention (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, 
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Engle, & Khanna, 2003). WMC is also correlated with general fluid intelligence 
and performance on a number of cognitive tasks (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999; Engle, 2002; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Because of the 
correlation of WMC with attentional control and higher order cognitive tasks, 
working memory is believed to represent a more general cognitive system 
reflecting control of executive attention (Engle, 2002). 
Working Memory Capacity and Mind Wandering 
The nature of the association between WMC and mind wandering differs 
between the resource-demanding and resource-free views of mind wandering. 
The hypothesis that mind wandering is resource demanding considers WMC as 
the availability of domain-general resources and shares similarities with 
Baddeley's (2000) model of working memory. For example, Smallwood (2010) 
argues that domain-general resources support the continuity of internal trains of 
thought in a multimodal workspace. Therefore, higher WMC (more domain-
general resources) should be associated with more mind wandering, from the 
resource demanding view. 
In fact, Levinson, Smallwood, and Davidson (2012) did find that as WMC 
increases so does mind wandering in low-demanding tasks, such as low 
perceptual load conditions. To further understand the role of working memory 
resources in mind wandering, Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor (2009) 
investigated the proportion of future and past-oriented thoughts in a choice 
reaction time (CRT) task, with a working memory load manipulation. They argue 
 16 
that future-oriented mind wandering requires more working memory resources 
because it requires planning or creating a potential scenario, whereas past-
oriented mind wandering simply requires recollecting past experiences. To 
determine this, TUT was further classified into past, present or future-oriented 
while performing no working memory load and working memory load tasks. In the 
no working memory load, task participants responded to rare target numbers and 
responded as to whether the number was even or odd. In the working memory 
load condition on rare target numbers, they had to decide if the previous number 
was even or odd. They found that future-oriented mind wandering decreased 
under working memory load, whereas past-oriented mind wandering was not 
affected, suggesting that future-oriented mind wandering requires working 
memory resources. Furthermore, in a non-demanding CRT task, WMC was 
positively associated with future-oriented mind wandering, and negatively 
associated with past-oriented mind wandering, though not correlated with overall 
reports of mind wandering (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). Therefore, 
these results are consistent with a resource-demanding view of mind wandering; 
where future-oriented mind wandering is reduced, as fewer working memory 
resources are available, due to either increased working memory load or lower 
WMC. 
Alternatively, the hypothesis that mind wandering occurs in a resource-
free manner considers WMC as reflecting control of executive attention. From 
this perspective, mind wandering is a result of failures of goal maintenance. 
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Higher WMC represents more control of executive attention, and therefore less 
mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010). McVay and Kane (2009) investigated 
the association between WMC, mind wandering and performance on a SART 
task. As WMC increased, TUT decreased, and higher WMC and fewer TUTs 
predicted better SART performance (McVay & Kane, 2009). Furthermore, 
individual differences in WMC also predict propensity to mind wander outside the 
laboratory and in daily life. Kane et al. (2007) gave participants Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs), and the PDA would signal them to report whether their 
thoughts had wandered from whatever they were doing at that time, randomly 
throughout their day for seven days. They found that higher WMC was also 
associated with less mind wandering in daily life.  
Contrary to studies finding that higher WMC is associated with more mind 
wandering during non-demanding tasks (Levinson et al., 2012), and specifically 
for future-oriented mind wandering (Baird et al., 2011), McVay and Kane (2012) 
failed to find a correlation between WMC and mind wandering during a non-
demanding task. Challenging the findings, from Baird et al., (2011), that higher 
WMC is associated with more future-oriented mind wandering; McVay, Unsworth, 
McMillan, and Kane (2013) report results from two independent studies, using a 
much larger sample size and broader off-task thought classification. They found 
a lack of correlation between WMC and future-oriented or past-oriented mind 
wandering while performing the standard SART and a reading task. Therefore, 
these null results support a resource-free view of mind wandering. 
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It should be recognized that mind wandering occurring as a result of 
control-failures is not entirely inconsistent with a resource-demanding view. 
Where the resource-demanding and resource-free views differ is on the role of 
executive processes involved in maintaining mind wandering. Smallwood (2010) 
has proposed that while mind wandering may occur as a result of executive 
control-failures, once it has started executive processes act to ensure it’s 
continuity. Furthermore, he has suggested that there may be a context 
dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering. Under non-
demanding contexts, the need for executive control is low and one’s current 
concerns may easily gain access to domain-general processes. In this case, the 
context is conducive to mind wandering and executive control processes act to 
ensure the continuity of internal trains of thought. Therefore, higher WMC 
individuals will show more mind wandering in non-demanding task contexts. 
However, in demanding task contexts, the need for executive control is high and 
executive control processes must act to maintain attention on the task and away 
from mind wandering thoughts. In this case, mind wandering is a result of 
executive control failures. Therefore, higher WMC individuals will now show less 
mind wandering. Nevertheless, the context dependent relationship does assume 
that mind wandering requires working memory resources. However, most of the 
support for this context dependent relationship between WMC and mind 
wandering comes from separate studies looking at either demanding or non-
demanding task contexts individually. 
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Working Memory Load and Mind Wandering 
In order to investigate the components of Baddeley's (2000) working 
memory model in the production of stimulus-independent thought (SIT), Teasdale 
et al. (1995, 1993) have investigated the relationship between working memory 
load and mind wandering. Initial studies revealed that increasing task demands, 
by increasing memory load, decreased reports of mind wandering (Teasdale et 
al., 1993). To further investigate this relation, Teasdale et al. (1995) measured 
the frequency of stimulus-independent thought (SIT) during tasks that require 
different components of Baddeley (2000)’s working memory model. While they 
found a reduced rate of SIT during tasks that require the phonological loop 
subsystem and visuo-spatial sketchpad, this is likely due to the use of domain-
general resources of working memory such as the central executive. Support for 
this comes from Experiment 3 of Teasdale et al. (1995), in which they found an 
increase of SIT during a task that participants had previous practice on compared 
to a novel task. Additionally, in Experiment 4, the occurrence of SIT interfered 
with performance on a random number generation task, a task that relies on 
central executive processes. They found that not only do increased demands on 
the central executive reduce the occurrence of SIT but also when SIT does 
occur, it impairs performance on a concurrent task requiring the central 
executive. Therefore Teasdale et al. (1995) concluded that the production of SIT 
requires working memory resources and more specifically central executive 
processes. This conclusion is consistent with a resource-demanding view of mind 
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wandering. As the demands of executive control processes increase; the fewer 
resources will be available to support the maintenance of task-unrelated 
thoughts.  
 McVay and Kane (2010), however, explain the consistent findings of 
reduced mind wandering with increased task demands from the control-failure 
model. They argue that tasks requiring more working memory resources are 
confounded with task set to maintain engaged with the task. As a task becomes 
more demanding, increased proactive control will act to prevent task 
disengagement; and therefore, interference from TUT is reduced. The results 
from these studies, then, are interpreted as not a competition of working memory 
resources devoted to the task and mind wandering; but rather, that greater task 
demands require more proactive control to keep distracting information (such as 
TUT) from interfering with task performance. While most of the evidence is 
consistent with either the resource-demanding or resource-free hypothesis, 
McVay and Kane (2010) point out evidence that is difficult to explain in terms of 
the resource-demanding view. This evidence comes from studies that keep task 
demands constant but manipulate the amount of working memory resources that 
are available. For instance, if alcohol and fatigue reduce executive control 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), then according to the resource-demanding view, 
there should be fewer resources for TUT; and therefore, TUT should decrease 
with fatigue or inebriation. However, according to the control-failure view, 
reducing executive control should lead to more control-failures; and therefore, 
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TUT should increase with fatigue or inebriation. In support of the control-failure 
view, studies have found an increase of TUT with alcohol consumption and 
fatigue (McVay & Kane, 2009; Sayette et al., 2009; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 
2004). 
 Another way to manipulate the amount of attentional resources in a task is 
perceptual load. In a typical perceptual load task, participants are instructed to 
search an array of letters for a target letter (e.g. either N or X) among a set of 
irrelevant letters. A response-related distractor will appear outside of the search 
array and can be either compatible (same response as target letter) or 
incompatible (alternative response as target letter). According to the perceptual 
load theory (Lavie & Tsal, 1994), if perceptual load is low (homogenous irrelevant 
letters, e.g. all O’s), spare attentional resources will automatically process task-
irrelevant information; therefore, there is distractor interference. Whereas when 
perceptual load is high (heterogeneous irrelevant letters e.g. HKMLP), capacity-
limited attentional resources are consumed for processing of the target stimulus, 
and therefore, the distractor interference is not found. Forster & Lavie (2009) 
were interested in whether perceptual load also minimizes distracter interference 
from internal sources such as mind wandering, and investigated the amount of 
task-unrelated thought (TUT) under low and high perceptual load. They found 
that increasing perceptual load not only decreases processing of external 
distractors but also of TUT, suggesting a central attentional resource for external 
and internal information. Thus, the more attentional processes devoted to task-
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relevant information the less interference from TUT. Additionally, they found that 
as TUT increased, the amount of distracter interference also increased. This 
finding suggests that the experience of mind wandering interferes with resolving 
response conflict in the perceptual load task. 
Using the same high and low perceptual load display as Forster and Lavie 
(2007), Levinson et al. (2012) found that higher WMC was associated with more 
mind wandering under low perceptual load conditions but found no correlation 
between WMC and mind wandering under high perceptual load conditions. 
It is, however, important to point out the differences between working 
memory load and perceptual load manipulations. Lavie et al. (2004) found that 
perceptual load and working memory load can actually have opposite effects on 
distractor interference. While increasing perceptual load is found to decrease 
distractor interference, increasing working memory load leads to increased 
distractor interference. The purpose of the current study is to investigate the role 
of working memory load on mind wandering, during a distracter interference task. 
 
The Simon Task 
 Another task that has been widely used to understand distracter 
interference is the Simon task (Proctor, 2011). In the Simon task, response 
interference is due to correspondence between an irrelevant stimulus location 
and a response location. For instance, a response is made to a target stimulus 
(i.e. Left response/red square and right response/green square) that appears on 
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either the left or right side of the stimulus display. Even though the stimulus 
location is irrelevant and to be ignored, response times are shorter when the 
location of the stimulus is congruent with the response location (left/left) and 
longer when incongruent with the response location (left/right); this difference is 
referred to as a Simon compatibility effect (Hommel, 2011; Proctor, 2011; 
Rubichi, Nicoletti, Iani, & Umiltà, 1997). Research on Simon effects has 
addressed a wide variety of issues such as the role of attention and working 
memory in generating stimulus and response codes, how task contexts influence 
Simon effects and the role of automatic and cognitive processes (for a review; 
Hommel, 2011; Proctor, 2011). 
 The Simon effect is commonly explained from dual-route models of 
response selection (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Kornblum & Lee, 
1995). According to these models, response codes are activated by way of direct 
(automatic) and indirect (controlled) routes. In the Simon task, the irrelevant 
stimulus location produces a spatial stimulus code, which automatically activates 
a corresponding spatial response code. Thus, there is a tendency to make a left 
response to a stimulus appearing on the left side of a visual display and a right 
response to a stimulus appearing on the right side of a visual display. The 
relevant stimulus code (red or green square) is used to determine the correct 
response via the controlled route based on task instructions (i.e. “press the left 
hand key if the stimulus is a red square”). On congruent trials, the response 
activated by the automatic route corresponds to the correct response; responding 
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can continue along the automatic route. Whereas, on incongruent trials, the 
automatic route activates a response that is incongruent with the correct 
response, creating a response conflict; therefore, cognitive control is required for 
correct responding on incongruent trials. 
 Recent challenges to the dual-route model of the Simon effect have been 
made in favor of a response discrimination account. According to the response 
discrimination account activation of spatial response codes are not automatic but 
instead are formed in working memory (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004). However, if 
spatial response codes do require working memory resources, then increasing 
working memory load should reduce the Simon effect. Evidence for the response 
discrimination account comes from studies showing a reduced or eliminated 
Simon effect under working memory load (Wühr & Biebl, 2011; Zhao, Chen, & 
West, 2010). Zhao et al. (2010) found that the Simon effect was eliminated with 
verbal working memory load but not affected by spatial working memory load. 
Wühr and Biebl (2011), however, found that spatial working memory load 
eliminated the Simon effect whereas verbal load only reduced the Simon effect. 
Even though these two studies differ on the type of working memory load that 
has the greatest impact on the Simon effect, they both provide support for a 
response discrimination account.  
In the present experiment, the Simon task will be used as the main task. 
Since the Simon task simply requires responding to the presentation of a single 
target, it can be considered as a non-demanding task, and therefore will be 
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conducive to mind wandering. In a more demanding context, the Simon task will 
be performed with working memory load (dual task). The Simon task can be used 
to determine the amount of distracter interference by an irrelevant spatial 
location; therefore, measuring mind wandering on the Simon task can assess 








 In the current study, the effects of working memory load on the Simon 
effect will be crossed with individual differences in WMC. Previous research 
(Wühr & Biebl, 2011; Zhao et al., 2010) has found that verbal working memory 
load decreases or even eliminates the Simon effect. Therefore, it is expected that 
there will be a Simon effect in single task conditions and a decreased or 
eliminated Simon effect in dual task conditions (with working memory load). If the 
Simon task is a measure of distractor interference, then individuals with high 
WMC should show a smaller Simon effect in single task conditions. Furthermore, 
the effect of working memory load on the Simon effect should be greater for low 
WMC individuals. The main analysis on the Simon task will be on reaction times 
(RTs) as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 
(compatible vs. incompatible) mixed design ANOVA with task and compatibility 
as within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable. 
Mind Wandering 
 The main issue addressed in this study is whether mind wandering 
requires working memory resources. Studies investigating the role of working 
memory resources in mind wandering either look at WMC related differences or 
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the effects of working memory load, but not both in the same study. For example, 
Levinson et al. (2012) did investigate WMC related differences in non-demanding 
and demanding task context, specifically low and high perceptual load. However, 
a perceptual load manipulation is different from a working memory load 
manipulation (WML), as they can result in opposite effects on distractor 
interference (Lavie et al., 2004). The purpose of the current study is to further 
investigate this issue by crossing WMC related differences with a working 
memory load manipulation. Specifically, high and low WMC participants will 
perform the Simon task without verbal working memory load (single task) and 
with verbal working memory load (dual task) while being intermittently probed 
about the contents of their thought. The main analysis will compare the 
proportion of TUT as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. 
dual) mixed-design ANOVA with task as a within-subject variable and WMC as a 
between-subject variable. 
According to the control-failure model, mind wandering is a result of 
executive control failures and is sustained in a resource-free manner (McVay & 
Kane, 2010). The hypotheses of the resource-free, control-failure model are as 
follows. If mind wandering is a result of executive control failure and proceeds in 
a resource-free manner, then individuals with high WMC will experience fewer 
TUT in single and dual task conditions compared to those with low WMC, 
because higher WMC is related to better control of executive attention. This 
difference may be more pronounced in dual task conditions because demand to 
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prevent TUT interference on task performance is greater; therefore, control of 
executive attention differences should be more pronounced. Overall, there 
should be less TUT in a dual task compared to a single task; again, because 
demands to prevent mind wandering interference on task performance is greater 
for a dual task than a single task.  
An alternative view is that working memory resources are required to 
sustain an internal train of thought during mind wandering (Smallwood, 2010). 
The hypotheses of the resource-demanding view are as follows. If working 
memory resources are required to sustain mind wandering, then individuals with 
high WMC will experience more TUT compared to those with low WMC, in single 
and dual task conditions. More working memory resources are required to 
perform a dual task compared to a single task; therefore, there should be less 
mind wandering in a dual task compared to a single task. 
Mind Wandering and Task Performance 
Given the findings from Wühr and Biebl (2011) and Zhao et al. (2010) on 
the effects of working memory reducing the Simon effect, some predictions can 
be made regarding the effect of mind wandering on the Simon effect. From the 
resource-free view, mind wandering should increase the Simon effect because 
control-failures result in mind wandering, on one hand, and impair resolving 
response conflict in the Simon task, on the other (Weldon, Mushlin, Kim, & Sohn, 
2013). From the resource-demanding view, mind wandering should have the 
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same effect as working memory load by decreasing the Simon effect because it 
requires working memory resources.  
Furthermore, the two views of mind wandering can be dissociated by the 
effects of WMC on the relation between mind wandering and task performance 
(McVay & Kane, 2012). If mind wandering does not require working memory 
resources, then there should be no effect of WMC on relation between mind 
wandering and task performance. This is because the experience of mind 
wandering is a result of control-failures, regardless of WMC. If mind wandering 
does require working memory resources and low WMC individuals have fewer 
working memory resource, then mind wandering should have more of an impact 
on task performance for low WMC individuals compared to those with high WMC 
because low WMC individuals have fewer resources to split between mind 







 28 female students from California State University, San Bernardino, who 
completed the screening sessions of the working memory study participated in 
the current experiment. The screening sessions consisted of two, one-hour 
sessions in which participants completed measures of working memory and 
general fluid intelligence. The working memory measures included; portions of 
the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (finger windows, number 
letters, verbal working memory, symbolic working memory) (Sheslow & Adams, 
2003), operation-span and symmetry span tasks (Redick et al., 2012). The 
general fluid intelligence measures included; Raven’s Advanced Matrices 
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998), Inferences and Letter Sets (Ekstrom, French, 
Harman, & Dermen, 1976). Based on the Operation span partial score (described 
below), they were recruited from the top 25% (high WMC group) and bottom 25% 
(low WMC group) of the participant pool, resulting in 15 high WMC and 13 low 
WMC participants. Participants were compensated with a $10 gift card. All 
participants signed the consent form approved by the IRB, and were be treated in 
accordance with the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 




Working Memory Capacity 
 Participants completed the automated operation span (OSPAN); a dual 
task where participants need to remember presented memory items for later 
recall while performing an unrelated processing task (Redick et al., 2012). For 
the processing task, participants need to verify solutions to mathematical 
equations (yes or no response). OSPAN memory items consisted of 12 letters. 
After participants make a verification response, a random letter appears, and the 
participant is to remember it for later recall. This sequence, processing task 
followed by a memory letter, is repeated 3-7 times. Following this, all 12 letters 
are displayed and participants need to identify the presented memory letters in 
their serial order, the order in which they appeared. Each set length (3-7) was 
presented three times, randomly ordered for each participant. 
 Scores on the OSPAN task were calculated as the sum of correct items 
recalled in their serial position (partial span scores), with a maximum score of 75 
(Redick et al., 2012). Participants were divided into low-span and high-span 
groups based on the percentile distribution of partial OSPAN scores presented in 
Redick et al. (2012). Low-span participants were selected from the bottom 25th 
percentile and high-span participants from the top 75th percentile. 
Simon Task 
 Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by E-Prime 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a PC-compatible computer. 
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Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor. In the single task condition, 
participants performed the Simon task. For the stimulus display, a target stimulus 
(red or green square) was presented to the left or right of a central fixation point. 
Participants were instructed to press the “n” key with their right index for a green 
square and the “x” key with their left index finger for a red square. They were also 
instructed to ignore the location of the target stimulus, as it was irrelevant. The 
target stimulus location could either be compatible or incompatible with the 
response location. In a dual task condition, participants performed the same 
Simon task, however with working memory load. The memory task manipulation 
was a verbal working memory load of 6 digits, ranging from 1-9. For the memory 
display, the memory items were displayed horizontally above the central fixation 
point. In the memory probe display, a single digit (1-9) was presented. 
Participants were instructed to press the “m” key, with their right middle finger, if 
the single digit was among the memory items and to press the “z” key, with their 
left middle finger, if the single digit was not among the memory items. Reaction 
times (RT) and error rates on the Simon task and memory task were analyzed as 
a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 (compatible vs. 
incompatible) mixed-design ANOVA with task and compatibility as within-subject 
variables and WMC as a between-subject variable. 
Thought Probes 
 When a thought probe appeared on the display, participants were asked 
“what were you thinking just now?” along with the following response options, 1) 
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Task-related thought 2) A memory from the past 3) Something in the future 4) 
Current state of being 5) Other. Before beginning the experiment, participants 
were given an explanation or example of each option. Participants were to report 
what was passing through their mind by pressing the corresponding number key. 
Option 1 was coded as on-task thought while options 2-5 were considered as 
TUT (McVay et al., 2013). Proportion of responses to thought probes were 
analyzed as a 2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 
(Thought type: on-task vs. TUT) mixed-design ANOVA with task and thought 
type as within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable. 
Proportion of past and future-oriented mind wandering were also compared as a 
2 (WMC: low-span vs. high-span) x 2 (Task: single vs. dual) x 2 (Thought 
orientation: past vs. future) mixed-design ANOVA with task and compatibility as 
within-subject variables and WMC as a between-subject variable. 
 
Procedure 
 The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. The following description of 
the experimental procedure is depicted in Figure 1. In the single task condition, a 
central fixation point was presented for 1000 msec followed by a mask (######) 
for 3000 msec. Another fixation display was presented for 500 msec followed by 
a stimulus display for 2000 msec or until participants made a response to the 
target stimulus by pressing their right index finger for a green circle and left index 
finger for a red circle, ignoring target location. After the stimulus display, a central 
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fixation point was presented for another 500 msec followed by a mask (#) for 
1000 msec. In the dual task condition, a central fixation point was presented for 
1000 msec. Then the memory display, containing six memory items, was 
presented for 1500 msec followed by a mask (######) for 1500 msec. Next 
another fixation point was displayed for 500 msec followed by the stimulus 
display for 2000 msec or until participants made a response. Another fixation 
point was displayed for 500 msec followed by the memory probe display for 2000 
msec or until a response was made. Note that the trial durations were the same 
for single and dual tasks, the only difference being that in the single task the 
memory items were replaced with a #. Practice blocks consisted of 3 blocks for 
the single task, 2 blocks for memory task only, and 3 blocks dual task with 8 trials 
in each block followed by a thought probe. In the experimental session, the single 
and dual tasks were counterbalanced in an ABBA fashion for a total of 20 blocks 
of 20 trials. Thought probes were presented at the end of each block. 
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Demographic information for the WMC groups were compared and no 
differences were found on Age (High WMC: M  = 24.4, SD = 6.08, Low WMC: M  
= 22.5, SD = 2.9), class standing (High WMC: M  = 3.4, SD = 0.91, Low WMC: M  
= 3.1, SD = 0.75), number of credits earned (High WMC: M  = 123.2, SD = 58.00, 
Low WMC: M  = 117.9, SD = 49.28) and GPA (High WMC: M  = 3.2, SD = 0.54, 
Low WMC: M  = 3.0, SD = 0.40). Mean OSPAN partial scores were significantly 
difference between the high WMC group 68.5 (SD  = 2.48) and the low WMC 
group 39.9 (SD  = 7.98), t(26) = 13.25, p < .001. 
 
Simon Task 
For all analyses on RTs, incorrect responses were excluded. The same 
exclusion criteria was used as Zhao et al. (2010); for single task conditions, RTs 
shorter than 150ms and longer than 1500ms were excluded from analyses and 
for dual task conditions, RTs shorter than 250ms and longer than 2500ms were 
excluded. Mean RTs and error rates on the Simon task are shown in Table 1, 





Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the Simon Task with Working Memory 
Load Conditions for Low and High Working Memory Capacity Participants 
 
 
Reaction Times  
For RTs, There was a main effect of Task, in which RTs were shorter for 
single task conditions than dual task conditions, F(1, 26) = 73.03, p < .001, partial 
η
2
 = .737. There was a main effect of compatibility, RTs were longer for 
incompatible than for compatible conditions, F(1, 26) = 54.08, p < .001, partial η2 
= .675; thus, there was a Simon compatibility effect. There was no main effect of 
WMC, although it was marginally significant with high WMC participants showing 
 
  
Low WMC High WMC 
  










Compatible         
M 569 1.3 679 2.3 486 0.3 608 1.0 
SD 125.6 1.25 141.5 2.39 94.2 0.46 125.0 1.07 
Incompatible         
M 619 2.8 695 4.9 523 1.6 608 2.0 
SD 121.6 3.11 146.7 4.80 84.8 2.29 124.9 2.07 
I-C 50.2  16.3  37.3  0.0  
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shorter RTs overall, F(1, 26) = 3.66, p = .067, partial η2 = .123. A WMC × 
Compatibility interaction was significant, F(1, 26) = 4.26, p = .049, partial η2 = 
.141, in which there was a larger Simon effect for low WMC compared to high 
WMC participants, see Figure 2. A Task × Compatibility interaction was 
significant, F(1, 26) = 18.18, p < .001, partial η2 = .412, see Figure 3. There was 
no Simon effect for the dual task condition, t(27) = 1.63, p=.114, whereas the 
Simon effect was significant for the single task condition, t(27) = 688, p < 
.001.There was neither a WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.19, p = .667, nor 
a WMC × Task × Compatibility three-way interaction, F(1, 26) = .04, p = .841. 
The lack of a thee-way interaction was due to a similar reduction in the Simon 
compatibility effect from single to dual task conditions, for both high WMC (Mean 
dual task reduction = 37.3 msec) and low WMC participants (Mean dual task 
reduction = 33.9). However, even though reductions in the Simon effect were 
similar between WMC groups, the Simon effect in dual task conditions was 
eliminated for the high WMC participants (M = 0.03, SD = 22.37), t(14) = .01, p = 
.995, and only reduced yet still significant for the low WMC participants (M = 
16.31, SD = 24.98), t(12) = 2.35, p = .036. 
Error Rates 
 For error rates, there was a main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 6.81, p = .015, 
partial η2 = .208; high WMC participants made fewer errors compared to low 
WMC participants. There was a main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 9.36, p = .005, 
partial η2 = .265. More errors were made in dual task conditions compared to 
Figure 2. Mean Reaction Times on 





































Figure 3. Mean Reaction Times on Compatible and Incompatible Trials for 
Working Memory Load Conditions, Collapsed Across Working Memory Capacity 
Groups 
 
 single task conditions. There was also a main effect of compatibility, F(1, 26) = 
10.02, p = .004, partial η2 = .278, in which more errors were made on 
incompatible compared to compatible trials; thus, there was a Simon effect in 
error rates as well. However, there were no significant interactions anywhere; in 
other words, there was no effect of WMC or Task on the magnitude of the Simon 



























RTs and error rates on the memory task are shown in Table 2, and were 
analyzed separately as 2 (WMC) × 2 (Compatibility) mixed design ANOVAs. For 
RTs, there was no main effects of WMC, F(1, 26) = 1.82, p = .188, or 
compatibility, F(1, 26) = .251, p = .621, and no interaction, F(1, 26) = .001, p = 
.997. For error rates, there was a main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 10.00, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .278, error rates were lower for high WMC participants compared to 
low WMC participants. There was a main effect of compatibility, F(1, 26) = 13.13, 
p = .001, partial η2 = .336, but no interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.24, p = .627. Error 
rates on the memory task were higher if the Simon trial was incompatible 




Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates on the Memory Task for Low and High 




The five response options to thought probes were 1) Task-related thought, 
2) A memory from the past, 3) Something in the future, 4) Current state of being 
and 5) Other. Response option 1 was considered as on-task while response 
options 2-5 were considered as TUT. The percentage of TUT was calculated as 
the number of responses made for options 2-5 divided by 10, the total number of 
thought probes. 
 
Low WMC High WMC 
Compatibility RT % Errors RT % Errors 
Compatible     
M 908 17.8 797 7.8 
SD 257.2 10.36 173.7 6.30 
Incompatible 
    
M 904 21.0 794 10.2 
SD 262.2 11.68 175.5 6.89 
Average 906 19.4 795 9.0 
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Percentage of response options are presented in Table 3 and were 
analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) × 6 (Thought type) mixed design ANOVA. The 
main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 34.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .567, was due to 
TUTs and is analyzed separately below. There was a main effect of Thought 
type, F(1, 26) = 33.32, p < .001, partial η2 = .562 in which there were differences 
in the amount of thought types reported. The effect of task was different for the 
six Thought types as indicated by the Task × Thought type interaction, F(1, 26) = 
24.49, p < .001, partial η2 = .485, and this interaction will also be analyzed 
separately below, for the Thought types of interest. No other effects or interaction 




Mean Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought Response Options Comparing 
WMC in Single and Dual Tasks 


































































 The percentage of TUTs are shown in Figure 4 and were analyzed as a 2 
(WMC) × 2 (Task) mixed design ANOVA. There was a main effect of Task, F(1, 
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26) = 34.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .567. The percentage of TUT was reduced in 
the dual task conditions (M = 34.3%) compared to the single task conditions (M = 
68.2%). There was no main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 0.54, p = .470, and no 
WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.79, p = .383. 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Task-Unrelated Thought for Low and High Working 
Memory Capacity Participants in Single and Dual Task Conditions 
 
Past, Future and Current State of Being 
Percentage of TUT type were analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) × 5 (TUT 
type) mixed design ANOVA. There was a main effect of Task, F(1, 26) = 34.08, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .567, which was already reported above. There was a main 





















were differences in the TUT type reported. The effect of Task was different for 
the TUT type as indicated by the Task × TUT type interaction, F(1, 26) = 13.49, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .342 and is analyzed separately for past, future and current 
state of being TUT below. 
 Proportions of past, future and current state of being TUT were calculated 
in two-ways in which they have been done so in previous research. First, past 
and future TUT were calculated as the percentage of overall thought reports, as 
done in Smallwood et al. (2009). This measure reflects participants overall 
propensity to engage in past or future oriented thought while performing the task. 
Percentage of past, future and current state of being TUT are presented in Table 
3 and were analyzed as 2 (WMC) × 2 (Task) mixed design ANOVAs. 
Thought Type / Overall Thought Report 
There were no main effects of WMC, F(1, 26) = 1.53, p = .227, or Task, 
F(1, 26) = 0.26, p = .616, and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.66, p = 
.424, on percentage of Past/Total. For Future/Total, there was a main effect of 
Task, F(1, 26) = 9.91, p = .004, partial η2 = .276, in which Future/Total were 
reduced for the dual task compared to the single task, see Figure 5. There was 
no main effect of WMC and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.08, p = 
.777, for percentage of Future/Total. For current state of being, there was no 
main effect of WMC, F(1, 26) = 0.19, p = .665. There was a main effect of Task, 
F(1, 26) = 14.07, p = .001, partial η2 = .351, in which thoughts about current state 
of being were reduced for the dual task compared to the single task. There was 
no main effect of WMC, 
interaction, F(1, 26) = 0.80, 
being/Total. 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Future
Reports for Low and High Working Memory Capacity P
Dual Task Conditions 
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one low WMC participant did not report any TUTs on dual task conditions and 
therefore proportion of past and future TUT could not be calculated. This resulted 
in 24 participants (high WMC: n = 12, low WMC: n = 12) in which percentage of 
past, future and current state of being TUT were analyzed as a 2 (WMC) × 2 
(Task) mixed design ANOVA. 
 There was a main effect of WMC on percentage of past TUT, F(1, 22) = 
4.76, p = .040, partial η2 = .178, see Figure 6. High WMC participants showed 
more past TUTs (M = 21.1%) compared to low WMC participants (M = 5.8%). 
There was no main effect of Task on percentage of past TUT, F(1, 22) = 1.90, p 
= .182, and no WMC × Task interaction for past TUT, F(1, 22) = 1.60, p = .220. 
For percentage of future TUT, there were no main effects of Task, F(1, 22) = 
0.74, p = .399, or WMC, F(1, 22) = 1.83, p = .190, and no WMC × Task 
interaction, F(1, 22) = 0.99, p = .330. For percentage of current state of 
being/TUT, there were no main effects of WMC, F(1, 22) = 0.02, p = .895, or 
Task, F(1, 22) = 0.04, p = .837, and no WMC × Task interaction, F(1, 22) = 0.26, 
p = .614. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of Past
Thoughts for Low and High Working Memory Capacity Participants 
Dual Task Conditions 
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with performance in either the single or dual tasks. However, for low WMC 
participants TUTs did correlate with compatibility effects, r (11) = -.559, p = .047, 
and error rates, r (11) = .611, p = .026, in the single task conditions. As TUTs 




Table 4.  
Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and Performance Measures for 
High Working Memory Capacity Participants 
Note. N = 15. Simon effect was calculated by taking RTs in incompatible 
conditions minus compatible conditions. RTs, and errors were collapsed across 
compatibility conditions.  
* p < .05, ** p  < .001 
  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Single Task TUT 
-         
2. Dual Task TUT 
.59* -        
3. Single Task RTs 
-0.35 -0.04 -       
4. Dual Task RTs 
-.56* -0.31 .89** -      
5. Single Task Simon Effect 
-0.28 -.66** -0.39 -0.12 -     
6. Dual Task    Simon Effect 
-0.22 -0.07 0.13 -0.01 -0.30 -    
7. Single Task Errors 
0.14 -0.17 0.29 0.36 -0.07 -0.44 -   
8. Dual Task  Errors 
-0.13 -0.05 -0.17 -0.14 -0.03 0.20 0.19 -  
9. Memory Errors 
-0.06 -0.33 -0.36 -0.37 0.36 -0.16 -0.16 0.18 - 
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Table 5.  
Correlations amongst Task-Unrelated Thoughts and Performance Measures for 
Low Working Memory Capacity Participants 
Note. N = 13. Simon effect was calculated by taking RTs in incompatible 
conditions minus compatible conditions. RTs, and errors were collapsed across 
compatibility conditions.  
* p < .05, ** p  < .001 
  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Single Task TUT 
- 
        
2. Dual Task TUT 
0.39 -        
3. Single Task RTs 
0.25 0.04 -       
4. Dual Task RTs 
-0.00 0.06 .91** -      
5. Single Task Simon Effect 
-.56* -0.19 -0.10 0.26 -     
6. Dual Task    Simon Effect 
0.38 -0.17 0.36 0.21 -0.11 -    
7. Single Task Errors 
.61* 0.00 0.38 0.25 -0.17 0.23 -   
8. Dual Task  Errors 
0.34 -0.13 0.46 0.23 -0.45 0.14 .71** -  
9. Memory Errors 





Summary of Results 
In summary, the Simon effect was reduced in dual task conditions and to a 
similar degree between high and low WMC groups. However, high WMC 
participants showed an elimination of the Simon effect in dual task conditions; 
whereas, the low WMC group only showed a reduction of the Simon effect. 
Overall, high WMC participants had a smaller Simon effect compared to those 
with low WMC. 
In regards to mind wandering, TUTs were less frequent in dual task 
compared to single task conditions and this was specifically for future and current 
state of being TUTs. There was no effect of WMC on overall amount of TUTs and 
no WMC x task interaction. High WMC participants did show more past TUTs, 
though only when calculated out overall amount of TUTs. For the correlations of 
mind wandering with task performance, TUTs did correlate with Simon effects 
and error rates in single task conditions but only for the low WMC group. TUTs 
negatively correlated with Simon effects and positively correlated with error rates. 
 
The Role of Working Memory in the Simon Task 
The response discrimination account of the Simon effect claims that 
interference between irrelevant spatial codes and relevant response codes arises 
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in working memory (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004). According to this account, it was 
expected that the Simon effect would be reduced or even eliminated for the dual 
task conditions compared to the single task conditions. The results supported the 
response discrimination account and are consistent with previous studies by 
Wühr and Biebl (2011) and Zhao, Chen, and West (2010), where they found 
either a reduction or even elimination of the Simon effect by a verbal working 
memory load. Furthermore, but less confidently, it was expected that the low 
WMC participants would show a greater reduction in the Simon effect compared 
to high WMC participants. However, the reduction of the Simon effect was the 
same between WMC groups. Although the reduction was of the same magnitude, 
the Simon effect was eliminated for high WMC but not low WMC participants.  
Why the Simon effect was eliminated for the high WMC participants but 
only reduced for low WMC participants is not clear. Although it could be due to 
the fact that the magnitude of the Simon effect for the high WMC was lower in the 
first place, the absence of a Simon effect vs. the presence of a Simon effect is an 
important distinction. One possibility is that the two groups used different 
representations for spatial response codes in working memory. Wühr and Biebl 
(2011) found differential effects of verbal and spatial working memory on 
horizontal and vertical Simon effects. Their interpretation is that the horizontal 
Simon task is represented by visual-spatial codes whereas the vertical Simon 
task is represented by verbal codes. However, it is not clear why the two groups 
would use different response code representations without any instruction to do 
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so. Another explanation could be due to differential overlap of verbal working 
memory load with irrelevant location information and relevant stimulus-response 
location. Wühr and Biebl (2011) explain their results from a specialized load 
account (Park, Kim, & Chun, 2007). They assume that overlap between working 
memory load and irrelevant location information had a greater effect than overlap 
between working memory load and relevant stimulus-response location, in the 
Simon task. Overlap of the former would result in a decrease of the Simon effect 
and overlap of the latter would result in an increase of the Simon effect. It could 
be that, high WMC participants are better at minimizing the overlap of working 
memory load and relevant stimulus-response location; and therefore, high WMC 
participants showed no Simon distracter interference and low WMC participants 
showed only a reduced Simon effect. Further investigations would be needed to 
confirm this interpretation, however findings from Weldon et al. (2013) suggest 
that those with higher WMC more optimally adjust the level of cognitive control to 
resolve response conflicts on the Simon task. 
 
The Relation Between Working Memory and Mind Wandering 
The current study investigated competing hypotheses concerning the 
relation between working memory resources and mind wandering. The resource-
demanding hypothesis states that mind wandering consumes working memory 
resources; whereas, the resource-free hypothesis states that mind wandering 
occurs without the need of working memory resources and is a result of control 
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failures. Under the resource-demanding hypothesis, it was expected that mind 
wandering would decrease in dual task conditions compared to single task 
conditions and high WMC participants would mind wander more than low WMC 
participants. The resource-free hypothesis expected the same relation between 
Task and mind wandering, but expected that high WMC participants would mind 
wander less than low WMC participants, especially in dual task conditions. While 
previous studies on mind wandering have not combined working memory load 
manipulations with working memory capacity measures, the current study did so. 
As expected under both hypotheses, it was found that dual task conditions 
reduced mind wandering. However, no differences were found between high and 
low WMC participants on the overall amount of mind wandering, which was not 
expected by either hypothesis. 
 Even though there was no effect of WMC on mind wandering, previous 
research has actually found inconsistent findings on this relationship. In non-
demanding task contexts, Levinson et al. (2012) found that higher WMC is 
associated with more mind wandering while other studies have found no 
correlation at all (Baird et al., 2011; McVay & Kane, 2012). Therefore, the 
findings reported here that WMC does not affect mind wandering, at least in 
single task conditions, is consistent with some previous research. It may be that 
under non-demanding task contexts WMC is just not associated with mind 
wandering and that it requires a more demanding task for there to be an 
association (McVay & Kane, 2010).  
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 More challenging to explain is the result that WMC does not affect mind 
wandering in dual task conditions. In fact, a consistent finding in the literature is 
that higher WMC is associated with less mind wandering under demanding task 
contexts (McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; McVay & Kane, 
2009, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2012). One possibility may be due to the 
differences in the demanding task used in the current study and previous studies. 
Most studies showing WMC related differences in mind wandering have used the 
SART as the demanding task while a dual-task paradigm was used here. While 
they both can be considered as demanding they share very little similarities. On 
the SART task, goal maintenance is required to prevent pre-potent or habitual 
responding on no-go trials; whereas, dual-task interference and resolving 
response conflict is the challenge on the Simon task with working memory load. It 
could be argued that maintaining task goals on the SART task is more directly 
related to mind wandering, because of control failures, than minimizing dual-task 
interference on the Simon task is related to mind wandering. In fact, McVay and 
Kane (2012) found an effect of WMC on mind wandering in only a standard 
SART but not a vigilance SART. In the standard SART, no-go trials are 
infrequent, whereas in the vigilance SART no-go trials are frequent and go-trials 
are infrequent. An explanation they provide for their findings is the lack of a goal 
maintenance component to the vigilance SART. Therefore, the differences in 
findings from the current study to previous studies may have to do with the 
differences in the type of demands on the two tasks. Perhaps working memory 
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capacity only predicts propensity for mind wandering in tasks that place high 
demands on active goal maintenance, or proactive executive control. This would 
be an interesting area for further investigation. 
The effect of task demands on reducing mind wandering is a robust 
finding in the literature on mind wandering and was predicted by both the 
resource-demanding and resource-free views of mind wandering. Where the two 
hypotheses differed was in their prediction on the relationship between WMC and 
mind wandering; however, there were no WMC related differences found in this 
study. Keeping in mind that although there are no significant differences, there 
are trends in the data that suggest an effect of WMC. While high and low WMC 
participants showed nearly the same amount of mind wandering in single task 
conditions (M = 67.2% and M = 69.3%, respectively), high WMC participants 
tended to show less mind wandering (M = 28.7%) in dual conditions compared to 
low WMC participants (M = 40.8%). This trend for high WMC participants to show 
less mind wandering in the dual task conditions lends more support to a control-
failure model of mind wandering. 
 Although the current results are not able to reconcile whether working 
memory resources are required for maintaining mind wandering, the findings on 
future-oriented TUT indicate a role of working memory resources. Smallwood, 
Nind, and O’Connor (2009) have argued that future-oriented mind wandering 
requires more working memory resources than past-oriented. Future-oriented 
mind wandering was found to have decreased in dual task compared to single 
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task conditions; whereas, there was no effect of task on past-oriented mind 
wandering, consistent with results from Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor (2009). 
This finding suggests that at least future-oriented mind wandering requires 
working memory resources. However, there were no working memory capacity 
related differences on future-oriented mind wandering. Instead, high WMC 
participants showed more past-oriented mind wandering than low WMC 
participants but only when past TUT was calculated out of the overall amount of 
TUT. 
In addition to the findings on future-oriented TUT, there is some indication 
that mind wandering consumes working memory resources similar to that of 
working memory load. Consistent with a response discrimination account of the 
Simon effect (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004), working memory load reduced the Simon 
effect. Interestingly, in the single task conditions mind wandering acted similarly 
to a working memory load as evident by the large negative correlation between 
TUTs and the Simon effect, r(26) = -.423, p = .025. Just as working memory load 
reduces the Simon effect, as the amount of TUTs increased the Simon effect 
decreased. Furthermore, this correlation was actually only significant for the low 
WMC group, r(11) = -.559, p = .047, but not the high WMC group, r(13) = -.283. 
This WMC related difference of mind wandering on task performance lends more 
support to the resource-demanding view because high WMC individuals should 
have more resources to distribute between mind wandering and performing the 
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task. Whereas from the resource-free view, because mind wandering is a result 
of control-failures it should affect performance regardless of WMC.  
While the trend in the data of WMC on mind wandering supports a 
resource-free view and control-failure model, the findings on future-oriented TUT 
and mind wandering on task performance lend more support to the resource 
demanding view. A possible explanation for these disparate findings is from a 
context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering, which does 
assume that mind wandering requires working memory resources (Smallwood, 
2010). From this perspective, higher WMC leads to more mind wandering in non-
demanding contexts but less mind wandering in demanding task contexts. In the 
current study, there was a trend towards an interaction in which higher WMC 
lead to less mind wandering in dual tasks but no effect of WMC in single tasks. In 
fact, the trend in the results are somewhat consistent with the results of a recent 
study (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) on mind wandering that also combined 
manipulations of task difficulty with WMC measures. 
Rummel and Boywitt (2014) used an n-back task to manipulate task 
demands, 1-n back for low task demands and 3-n back for high task demands. 
They found that WMC had a marginal, p < .07, negative correlation with TUT in 
low task demands and a positive correlation with TUT in high task demands. 
Higher WMC was associated with more mind wandering in low task demands 
and less mind wandering in high task demands. Within a single experiment, 
Rummel and Boywitt (2014) may be the first study to show support for the 
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context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering, suggested 
by Smallwood (2010). 
 In the current study, the lack of WMC related differences in mind 
wandering was not expected and may possibly be due to some limitations. One 
possible limitation why no WMC related differences in mind wandering were 
found may be due to splitting participants into low and high WMC groups. 
Previous studies that have found WMC related differences in mind wandering 
used WMC as a continuous variable (Baird et al., 2011; Levinson et al., 2012; 
McVay et al., 2009, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012). Additionally, the only 
measure of WMC used in the current study was the OSPAN and the use of 
multiple measures may provide a more accurate measure of an individuals WMC 
(Redick et al., 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 The role of working memory in mind wandering is not well understood and 
there are two hypotheses concerning this relationship, the resource-demanding 
and resource-free views. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the 
relationship between working memory capacity and mind wandering under 
demanding and non-demanding contexts. The results of the current study do not 
provide strong support for one hypothesis over the other. Although WMC related 
differences in mind wandering were non-significant, there was a trend towards a 
context dependent interaction between WMC and mind wandering and some 
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evidence for a role of working memory resources in mind wandering. Perhaps a 
context-dependent explanation of the relationship between working memory 
capacity and mind wandering offers the most complete explanation of the results 
in the current study as well as previous research. The different demands a task 
places on proactive executive control and response conflict may further clarify 
the role of working memory on mind wandering. The exact role working memory 
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The Role of Working Memory Resources in Mind Wandering: Informed Consent 
 
You are invited to participate in a study being conducted as a Master’s Thesis by graduate student Jason 
Tsukahara of the Psychology Department of California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB), under 
the supervision of Dr. Hideya Koshino. This study is approved by the Psychology Department 
subcommittee of the Institutional Review Board of California State University, San Bernardino, and a copy 
of the official Psychology IRB stamp of approval should appear on this consent form. The University 
requires that you give your consent before participating in this study. 
 
This study examines an interaction between working memory capacity and working memory load on mind 
wandering during an attention task. The experiment consists of single task and dual task sessions. The 
single task session includes an attention task, in which you will see a central fixation point followed by a 
stimulus display. In the dual task, you are asked to remember some memory items while you perform the 
attention task. Please respond as quickly and accurately as possible in the attention task. After the attention 
task, you will be asked to perform the memory test. At the end of each block you will be asked "what were 
you thinking just now?" and will be presented with several different response options. The entire session 
will take approximately one hour to complete. 
 
The experiments involves no risks beyond those of daily life, and no direct benefits to the individual other 
than an introduction to psychological research and $10 compensation for participating. However, your data 
may help to increase our understanding of working memory and mind wandering. The investigator will not 
associate your name in any way with the research findings, and all data are anonymous. Your participation 
in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without negative 
consequences. You may receive $10 for your participation.  Please feel free to ask any questions that you 
have. Should questions concerning the study arise at a later date, please do not hesitate to contact the 
principal investigator at the phone number or address below, or in the event of a research-related injury, 
please contact the University’s Institutional Review Board at (909) 537-5027. Results of this study will be 
available from Jason Tsukahara after the Spring quarter of 2014 upon request. 
 
Please read the following before indicating that you are willing to participate. 
 
1.   The study has been explained to me and I understand the explanation that has been given and what my 
participation will involve. 
2.   I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I may withdraw from participation at 
any time, or refuse to answer any specific question, without penalty or withdrawal of benefit to which I am 
otherwise entitled.  
3.   I understand that if I have any questions or concerns regarding this study, or if I wish to receive 
additional explanations after my participation is completed, I can contact Jason Tsukahara at (425) 770-
8506 or tsukj304@coyote.csusb.edu. 
I acknowledge that I have been informed of, and understand the true nature and purpose of this study, and I 
freely consent to participate.  I acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age. Please indicate your desire to 
participate by placing and “X” on the line below. 
 




California State University 
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee 
Approved 3/20/14 Void After 3/20/15 
IBB # H-14WI-32 Chair  
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